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vital questions that are not answered merely by showing that other people's philosophy has failed to throw light upon them.

To tell the truth, in the present exposition Professor James seems to lay little stress upon the above statement of the needs that these over-beliefs are meant to satisfy. On finding himself removed from the vigilant eyes of an exacting Presbyterian audience he seems to have discovered that far less was really forthcoming than was needed to satisfy them. Hence the method he adopts in his interesting Postscript of trying to square the "needs and experiences of religion" with the evidences of fact. All that we really require, we are here told, is that the "power should be other and larger than our conscious selves." "Anything larger will do so long as it be large enough to trust for the next step." Surely this depends on the length of the step. "It need not be infinite," he continues, "it need not be solitary. A final philosophy may have to consider the pluralistic hypothesis much more seriously than it has hitherto done." This is cutting our coat according to our cloth with a vengeance, as most readers will probably think, even those who ere they have reached the Postscript have reduced their expectations to the necessary dimensions and are prepared to accept the off chance of a God. For ourselves we are willing to consider anything, but before we reduce our intellectual demands upon the universe to the level that is here required, we may be excused if we demand to be assured by more convincing methods than Professor James has employed that there is no other and better way of approaching the question of the foundations of belief.

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PERSONAL IDEALISM. Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of the University of Oxford. Edited by Henry Sturt. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. x., 393.

This volume opens with an essay by Dr. Stout on "Error," of which it is impossible to speak too highly, and which forms a most important addition to Epistemology. Speaking of the definition of error as the agreement of thought with reality, Dr. Stout points out that it "omits to state that reality with which thought is to agree or disagree must itself be thought of, and that the thinker must intend to think of it as it is.

Otherwise there can be neither truth nor error" (p. 4.) "Cognitive process," he continues, "involves a transition or attempted transition from ignorance to knowledge, and where we are trying to make this transition there may be an intermediate state which is neither knowledge, nor ignorance, nor error. In what way then do we think of anything before we know it or appear to know it? I reply that it is an object of interrogative or quasi-interrogative consciousness. It is thought of as being one and only a *certain* one of a series or group of alternatives, though which it is we leave undecided" (p. 6.) "The content of thought is perpetually being used with perplexing vagueness. I propose to restrict its application. We cannot, without doing violence to language, say that the indeterminate as such is part of the content of thought. For it is precisely what the thought does not contain, but only intends to contain. On the contrary we can say with perfect propriety that it belongs to the *intent* of the thought. It is what the conscious subject intends when its selective interest singles out this or that object" (p. 9.)

We are thus conducted to a definition of error as "directly or indirectly a discrepancy between the intent and content of cognitive consciousness" (p. 10.) Again, "so far as the error is merely theoretical, what we mean to do is to think of a certain thing as it is, and what we actually do is to think of it as it is not" (p. 11.)

Since all error consists in taking for real what is mere appearance, we require a distinction between appearance and reality. "The imaginary object is only one case of mere appearance. It is the case in which the nature of what is presented to consciousness is determined merely by the psychical process of subjective selection. But there is always mere appearance when and so far as the nature of a presented object is determined merely by the psychological condition of its presentation, whatsoever these may be. There is always mere appearance when and so far as a presented object has features due merely to the special conditions of the flow of individual consciousness as one particular existence among others, connected with a particular organism and affected by varying circumstances of time and place" (p. 15.) At the same time the appearance is a qualification of the object and not of the percipient. "Mere appearance is in no sense an adjective of the cognitive subject. The person to whom a straight staff appears as bent when it is partially dipped in a pool is not him-

self apparently bent on that account either bodily or mentally The existence of mere appearance is not that of a psychical fact or event, except in the special case where the real object thought of happens to be itself of a psychical nature" (p. 18.)

From these considerations we may draw the conclusion that there is no pure error. "However much we may be deceived, the total object of our thinking or perceiving consciousness cannot be entirely illusory" (p. 32.). Again, error is only possible when we think of some reality which is capable of being conceived without the qualification said to be erroneous. "Now there are cases in which no such reality is assignable, and it is consequently meaningless to speak of error. I believe in the totality of being, and it is nonsense to say that I may be deceived. For there is no more comprehensive reality of which the totality of being can be conceived as a partial feature or aspect. Whatever point there may be in the ontological argument for the existence of God lies in this" (p. 35). And on analogous grounds, the belief in my own consciousness cannot be illusory.

The essay closes with an important criticism of Mr. Bradley's view that propositions which deal with anything except the absolute must be more or less erroneous. Dr. Stout's argument on this subject will not bear condensation and deserves the most careful study.

Mr. F. C. S. Schiller contributes in the second essay, "Axioms as Postulates," an exposition of a theory to which, following Dr. James, he gives the title of Pragmatism. "The world is constructed by experiment" (p. 57), but the conception of experiment is to be taken very widely. And "we never experiment *in vacuo*; we always start from, and are limited by, conditions of some sort" (p. 59). In our experiments we are to assume that complete success will be reached." "It is a *methodological necessity* to assume that the world is *wholly plastic*, i. e. *to act as though* we believed this, and will yield us what we want, if we persevere in wanting it" (p. 61). On this subject, we are further told, "a mechanically law-abiding universe does conform to some of our demands, and is so far intelligible. We must assume, therefore, that this conformity will extend further, that if we try sincerely and pertinaciously and ingeniously enough, we can force nature to reveal itself as wholly conformable to our nature and our demands" (p. 120).

As an illustration of this position, a detailed exposition is given of the proposition that "the conception of ideality is a free creation of a postulating intelligence which goes beyond its experience to demand the satisfaction of its desires" (p. 98).

Mr. Schiller desires to uphold the unity of human nature (p. 84). This he does by asserting that "thought must be conceived as an outgrowth of action, knowledge of life, intelligence of will, while the brain which has become an instrument of intellectual contemplation, must be regarded as the subtlest, latest, and most potent organ for effecting adaptation to the needs of life" (p. 85). And again, "in the last resort it is our practical activity that gives the real clue to the nature of things, while the world as it appears to the theoretic reason is secondary—a view taken from an artificial, abstract and restricted standpoint, itself dictated by the practical reason and devised for the satisfaction of its ends" (p. 90).

The third essay, by Mr. W. R. Boyce Gibson, is entitled "The Problem of Freedom in its Relation to Psychology." The author first discusses the contention that only matter in motion can be a determinant of material changes. He rejects, together with this view, the indeterminism of Dr. James. He suggests that there should be two psychologies in future, distinguished by the fact "that whilst the science of free agency accepts the capacity for real freedom as its fundamental fact, the inductive psychology unreservedly accepts the deterministic assumption as its only possible working postulate" (p. 169). The former can be genuinely explanatory, the latter is only descriptive (p. 185). Both are scientific and neither metaphysical by reason of their assumptions (p. 162). But the science of free agency stands in an especially close connection with metaphysics (p. 191).

Mr. G. E. Underhill considers the "Limits of Evolution." He sums up his results by saying that evolution can never deal with origins, and that it must assume the existence of unchanging laws of evolution, which, again, are indistinguishable from permanent qualities in the evolving things. Finally, in all scientific discoveries "the human mind discovers itself and its own intelligible relations" (p. 218).

Mr. R. R. Marett, dealing with "Origin and Validity in Ethics," separates the virtues into two groups, those which subserve on the whole, the "natural" end of race preservation, (the domestic and national), and those which subserve, on the whole, "spiritual" self-perfection (the personal and transcendental.) The

international virtues occupy an intermediate position (p. 259). He maintains that, "as empirical matter of fact" the normal individual of to-day is enjoined by his moral consciousness to prefer spiritual to natural principles" (p. 270). "The intuitional promptings" by which this is effected are considered by the author to be more trustworthy than discursive thought.

Mr. H. Sturt writes on "Art and Personality." He is of opinion that art is best understood by studying the artist, rather than the percipient of beauty. Also that "the supreme artistic interest, the mainspring of artistic creation, is an affectionate admiration for human persons" (p. 290). He considers enthusiasm to be indispensable to art.

Dr. Bussell deals with the "Future of Ethics." He points out that the majority of the inhabitants of Europe and America have not been mystics in the past, and are not likely to be mystics in the future.

The volume closes with a deeply interesting essay by Dr. Rashdall on "Personality, Human and Divine." The author "assumes that we have followed and accepted the line of argument which goes to prove that there is no such thing as matter apart from mind" (p. 370). He then determines the "differentia of a person" and finds the most essential of all attributes of personality is the fact that "the person is not merely a feeling but a willing or originating consciousness" (p. 372).

It is then pointed out that even the most perfect human beings are known to us—Socrates for example—are not perfect selves. From this Dr. Rashdall, if I understand him rightly, infers that no human being *can* be a perfect self, and that, if such a perfect self is to be found at all, it can only be found in God.

Is there, then, a personal God? Dr. Rashdall argues that since science asserts the existence of matter under circumstances in which no human being could perceive it, and since matter can only exist as experienced by some consciousness, we must conclude for the existence of a Universal Thinker. "And analogy would lead us to believe that we must attribute to the Universal Thinker in perfection all those characteristics which are implied by personality, and which yet no human person ever completely satisfied" (p. 376).

One person, Dr. Rashdall holds, cannot possibly be a part of another. What then is the relation between God and ourselves? Are we and God alike eternal and uncreated? Against this view

Dr. Rashdall has "no *a priori* objection." He rejects it, however, on the ground that it fails to account for the unity of the world, that it is incompatible with the correspondence of the state of the soul with the states of the God-created body, and that "the whole contrast between the known limits of human knowledge and the eternal omniscience of God prepares us by analogy for a corresponding contrast between an eternal or unoriginated mind and minds which are originated and dependent" (p. 381). The human mind then is derived from the one Supreme Mind, and the best phrase to use is to say that God creates it.

And when the finite souls are in being, they remain distinct from God. To suppose that they can be parts of God is to fall into a fallacy "that what constitutes existence for others is the same as what constitutes existence for self" (p. 382). To be in earnest with the personality of God compels us to think of him as feeling pleasure and pain "or something like pain," as loving persons and hating evil. "Do you say that all this makes God finite? Be it so if you will. Everything that is real is in that sense finite. God is certainly limited by all other beings in the universe, that is to say, by other selves, in so far as He is not those selves He is limited by his own eternal, if you like 'necessary' nature—a nature which wills eternally the best which that nature has it in it to create" (p. 390).

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THE METHODS OF ETHICS. By Henry Sidgwick, Sometime Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. Sixth Edition. London: Macmillan & Co., Limited. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1901.

When a book of philosophy has reached its sixth edition, its reviewer may well be excused from any lengthy survey of its merits. Especially is this the case when the book is by a contemporary writer, and when each successive edition has faithfully revealed the successive stages in the development of the mind of its author. More than the usual interest, however, attaches to the present edition of *The Methods of Ethics*: in it the book receives its last touch from its author's hand; in it we receive a